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SUMMARY 
Objective: This paper assessed the emergency prepar-
edness programs of health facilities for all-risks but 
focused on Road Traffic Accidents, (RTA) resulting in 
surge demand. It adopted W. H. O checklist covering 
hospital preparedness, equipment, manpower and surge 
capacity planning as best practices for the mitigation of 
public health emergencies.  
Method: This is a cross-sectional study of purposively 
selected health facilities. The method used consisted of 
site visit, questionnaire survey, literature and internet 
review. The W. H. O. standard for emergency prepar-
edness of health facilities was used to evaluate and 
assess the nation’s hospitals surge capacity programs. 
The study was conducted between March-June, 2010. 
A total of 22 district and regional health facilities in-
cluding teaching hospitals participated in the study. All 
10 regions of the country were covered.  
Result: These were: (1) many of the nation’s hospitals 
were not prepared for large RTA’s resulting in surge 
demands, and did not possess general emergency pre-
paredness programs. (2) The hospitals’ respective abili-
ties to handle large scale RTA’s were compromised by 
the lack of competent medical and allied health per-
sonnel and adequate supplies.  
Discussion: The inadequacies of the hospital system in 
responding to emergencies raise serious public health 
concerns. The biggest challenge facing the hospitals in 
their emergency intervention is the lack of pre-
emergency and emergency preparedness plans as well 
as the coordination of the hospitals response mecha-
nisms.  
Conclusion: The paper ended with recommendations 
on how the nation’s hospitals and their supervisory 
agencies could improve emergency preparedness.  
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Ghana needs a realistic national hospital and medical 
emergency response program designed on the principle 
of equitable distribution of appropriate equipment and 
supplies, and well trained emergency medical person-
nel. This paper evaluated the basic logistical assets 
preparedness of 22 Ghana hospitals for emergency 
intervention in surge situations. The World Health Or-
ganization, (2007) Field Manual for Capacity Assess-
ment of Health Facilities in Responding to Emergen-
cies was used in data collection but modified to suit the 
national situation. The WHO recommends periodic 
assessment of the capacity of health facilities’ response 
to emergencies. For example, the evaluation of South 
African hospitals found skills gap in that nation’s 
healthcare system. National authorities have also con-
ducted similar review of the Ghana healthcare system.  
 
They found many gaps in the efficiencies of both 
equipment and supplies of the nation’s healthcare sys-
tem. Recently, there was the evaluation of the trauma 
response capabilities of U. S. hospitals that were in-
volved in major incidents such as the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Those 
authors concluded that despite the large sums of money 
spent on preparedness, gaps still existed.1-4  
 
Health facilities should be able to perform not only in 
day-to-day hospital setting, but in handling challenging 
cases during surge periods.4-6 Surge capacity is a health 
facility’s ability to rapidly expand beyond normal ser-
vices to meet increased demand for bed space, quali-
fied personnel, medical services and public health pro-
grams in the event of a large scale disaster.7 Pre-
hospital emergency protocols is defined as a hospital’s 
pre-emergency preparedness standards and programs 
existing as deliberate part of its operational system, 
which is designed for deployment at the onset of chal-
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A hospital preparedness is a means for a hospital to test 
and evaluate its capabilities and, or recovering from an 
event that puts a significant strain on a hospital’s pa-
tient care and operating systems. The critical areas of 
hospital emergency preparedness are: (i) pre-hospital 
emergency preparedness, (ii) in-house emergency re-
sponse plans, (iii) human capacity and, (iv) the assess-
ment of existing infrastructure in emergency.  
 
The stock of infrastructure includes but not limited to 
ambulances, community transport system and Emer-
gency Medical Service, (EMS) delivery system. They 
also include intra-organizational mutual aid agreements 
and inter-hospital and supplier memorandum of under-
standing. These agreements should emphasize the con-
tinuity of supplies in emergencies against future pay-
ments and of course the availability of appropriate 
technological medical devices.8,9,12  
 
The absence of both emergency preparedness programs 
with surge capacity planning as well as adequate infra-
structure can lead to poor outcomes as was demonstrat-
ed on the 18th March, 2009. 13 In the RTA that occurred 
on the 18th of March, 41 people sustained serious burns 
when a LPG gas tanker crushed into a commuter bus 
and ignited at Winneba Junction, Ghana. Twelve of the 
passengers died on the spot, apparently from burns. 
Twenty-four were rescued from the inferno and taken 
to the District Hospital for treatment, but 2 died at the 
Emergency room. Of the 22 remaining, 15 were placed 
in the Male Ward and 7 were in the Female Ward. 
Each group later suffered 2 deaths, and with 1 female 
death at the Maternity Ward.  
 
An additional 5 separate bundles of burn corpses were 
delivered to the mortuary. Subsequently, all the 41 
burn victims perished, except one.13,14 Medical and 
emergency professionals who understand emergency 
preparedness are better equipped to respond to hospital 
emergencies adequately.3 Other studies have evaluated 
how casualty load affected the level of trauma care in 
multiple casualty incidents and how to define the surge 
capacity of the hospital trauma assets. In one of such 
study, it was found that there is a quantitative relation-
ship between increasing casualty load and gradual deg-
radation of the level of trauma care in multiple casualty 
incidents.15,16  
 
Similarly, another study concluded that a national 
computer tracking system of the availability of burns 
beds, patient triage and transportation improved patient 
care in multiple casualty burns events.16;17 However, 
other studies found that even in the industrialized na-
tions, hospital mass casualty preparedness efforts were 
in early stage of development at the time of their sur-
vey. These studies also found that the hospitals they 
surveyed lacked critical assets for emergency interven-
tion. Disaster planning, coordination, training, and re-
source capacity were also lacking in those hospi-
tals.18,19,21  
 
Road fatalities in Ghana have risen steadily from 1,578 
in 2000 to 1,856 in 2006 with the total number of regis-
tered vehicles being 511,063 and 841,314 respectively. 
Deaths from heavy goods vehicles rose from 235 in 
2004 to 270 in 2006, while at the same time, pedestrian 
casualty were 869 in 2004 and fell to 770 in 2006. Inju-
ries and fatalities from RTA’s are significant.10 This 
calls for improvements in the national medical emer-
gency preparedness program en mass. 
 
Another concern is the coordination of fire manage-
ment in emergencies. In RTA’s fire is a major risk fac-
tor but the Ghana National Fire Service, (GNFS) is 
often not in the position to offer credible intervention 
due to funding, personnel and equipment problems. In 
theory fire alarms are to be broadcast simultaneously to 
the Fire Service sub-station and area hospitals. In prac-
tice, however, there is little or no coordination between 
them in responding to fire emergencies and setting up 
on-site treatment post for fire victims. 13 In the case of 
ambulance service for either burn victims or victims 
with non-burn injuries but in RTAs, the limited fleet of 
ambulance in the nation, carries one bed and one pa-
tient at a time.  
 
The citizens often result to Community Emergency 
Transport system, (CETS) an ad hoc transport network. 
11 With respect to South Africa’s EMS program, for 
example, it was found that many doctors were poorly 
prepared to deal with pre-hospital trauma and emer-
gencies and that poorly managed EMS system led to 
poor outcomes.12,15,23 “Emergency preparedness and 
efficiency constitute a vital aspect of a government’s 
service to its citizens. Government agencies must pos-
sess the ability to expand rather than scale back emer-
gency services in times of crisis”.20 Some of the hospi-
tals in this study were not able to deliver immediate 
medical care in road traffic emergencies because the 
facilities did not have either the expertise such as trau-
ma doctors and nurses, and basic equipment such as 
oxygen tanks and breathing apparatus to handle many 
of the cases arising from such events.21  
 
Although the increasing rate of mortality cases in gen-
eral at government hospitals in the country have been 
attributed “… to bad professionalism on the part of 
some of the doctors serving within the government 
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According to the review of hospitals by the Ghana In-
tegrity Initiative in the Sub-region in 2008-9, the pro-
curement reform in relation to the health care industry2 
and facilities efficiencies,3  
 
Ghana’s medical infrastructure has been made vulnera-
ble by decades of neglect, poor management of finan-
cial assets and human capital. There appeared to be 
outright corruption in the healthcare purchases in spite 
of the procurement law and regulations.22,23 This situa-
tion has been exacerbated by systemic under-funding. 
Often hospitals do not have fully functioning laborato-
ries, X-ray and diagnostic or rehabilitation equipment, 
good supply-chain for logistics and consumables, as 
well as adequate graduate medical and support staff. 
Bed capacity is over-burdened with patients, some of 
whom sleep on mattresses in the corridors and passage 
ways. Bedding supplies are not in the best of condi-
tions. Some of the hospitals in this study have neither 
Intensive Care Unit, “ICU” nor make provisions for 
surge capacity.21-27  
 
There should be both in-hospital and out-hospital triage 
regimes in place for use by all hospitals. Triage is the 
sorting out of work protocols at impact site and stand-
ardization of front-office emergency room, in-hospital 
admission and treatment procedures based on medical 
emergency acuity, availability of trained staff, appro-
priate medical facility, supplies and proper patient dis-
tribution in an emergency. Triage also presumes a 
surge or convergence of patients who are “severely 
wounded”, “walking wounded”, ‘cuts and bruises’, 
‘worried well’, ‘information seekers’, and the preserva-
tion, tagging and storage of the dead, at an hospital 
from the 1st hour to the 24th, 48th, 70th hour and beyond.  
 
Treatment presumes availability of trained trauma 
medical and emergency staff, appropriate hospitals 
with Mutual-Aid Agreements and supplies. Transporta-
tion presumes qualified Emergency Medical Services, 
(EMS) equipment and crew, Emergent Groups or Vol-
unteers with basic knowledge of preparedness. The 
system designed by the Ghana Health Service does not 
take into consideration some of the essential areas. 11; 
21; 22, 26 
 
The objective of this paper is to (1) assess the assets of 
hospitals for emergency preparedness, including 
equipment, manpower and surge capacity planning 
consistent with W.H.O. standards and recommended 
best practices; (2) Evaluate and assess the nation’s 
hospitals surge capacity programs with respect to inter-





This is a cross-sectional study of purposively selected 
health facilities. The method used consisted of site vis-
it, questionnaire survey, literature and Internet review. 
The study was conducted between March-June, 2010. 
A total of 22 district and regional health facilities in-
cluding teaching hospitals participated in the study.  
All 10 regions of the country were covered. The fol-
lowing data collection techniques were used. 
 
Field visits 
Field visits were paid to the Winneba District Hospital, 
which was used as a case study for the handling and 
treatment of burns victims from the point of ignition to 
the ward. The Principal Investigator conducted a face-
to-face interview with key informants. The PI was giv-
en a tour of the wards and other facilities in the hospi-
tal. The goal of this field visit was to interview person-
nel on duty to find out their roles in the 18th March 
road traffic event. The study wanted to help understand 
the triage program in place for mitigating fire related 
road traffic emergency, and the general preparedness of 
that hospital for the treatment of burns.  
 
Survey Tool 
The World Health Organization’s Field Manual for 
Capacity Assessment of Health Facilities in Respond-
ing to Emergencies of 2007 was modified and adminis-
tered to the participating hospitals. In the health facili-
ties, interviews were conducted with key medical of-
ficers and, or other identified key informants.  
 
Analysis 
The completed questionnaires were translated into 
simple matrix checklist with the respective responses 
assembled for easy comparison.  
 
Desktop Review 
Systematic literature and Internet reviews of Hospital 
Emergency Preparedness and Surge Capacity Planning 
were undertaken. The literature review covered various 
national strategies, laws and policies on hospital emer-
gency preparedness, surge planning, and triage proto-
cols in place for burns victims in RTAs in Ghana and 
elsewhere. Some of these were accessed on the World 
Wide Web and from journals and national newspapers.  
 
The aim of the study was to document some of the dif-
ficulties faced by health facilities, their emergency pre-
paredness and the unique challenges they face in emer-
gency mitigation and how best to address such difficul-
ties. This was compared with international best practic-
es using the WHO hospital evaluation questionnaire as 
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Ethical Issues 
Permission was sought from all the in-charges of the 
select health facilities in the study. The in-charges and 
interviewees were assured of confidentiality of their 
data. Data safety and usage were purposely for aca-
demic work. There were no risks of using the data and 
the benefits of using the data were immense, such as 
publishing the findings to guide policy. Furthermore, 
there was no conflict of interests. 
 
RESULTS 
Hospital Facilities Emergency Preparedness for in-
tervention in burns cases 
Table 1 covers the emergency operating procedures for 
interventions in RTA burns cases within the 22 health 
facilities evaluated. We used the following descriptors 
to indicate whether facilities were average, above aver-
age, below average or unacceptable below average 
thus: A is 50%=Average, AA is 50%+ = Above Aver-
age, BA is 10-49% = Below Average, AU is 
<10%=Unacceptable below Average.  
 
The assessment of institutional support for training and 
education of staff for RTA burns victims revealed that 
86.4% of the facilities were AA or above average. The 
facilities also obtained AA status for the following are-
as: (a) availability of protocol for the management of 
burns and, (b) free treatment of victims in disasters and 
emergencies. When it came to whether or not the facili-
ties had documented emergency preparedness plans, 
only 27.3% of them did, which translated into BA or 
below average score. Although 46% (BA) had availa-
ble preparedness plans these were not documented. In 
terms of financial support for emergency program at 
the facilities, 36.4% (BA) reported having financial 
support for operating procedures for RTA burns vic-
tims. In terms of the availability of special wards for 
the management of burns cases, only 31.8% (BA) of 
the facilities reported having one (Table 1).  
 
Although the majority of the facilities could not con-
firm the existence of an emergency plan, 86.4% report-
ed that their “institutions support the training and edu-
cation for their emergency personnel including facili-
ties that reported that 
 (a) They had no plan in place and 
 (b) Those facilities that did not respond to the question 
at all.  
 
In emergency cases brought to the hospitals, 54.5% 
(AB) of the facilities said they provided “free treatment 
of patients during disaster situations” although the Na-
tional Health Insurance Scheme provides for all hospi-
tals to treat emergency cases whether the patient is a 
registered member or not.  
 
General Emergency preparedness and response to 
simulation exercise 
In assessing the general emergency preparedness pro-
grams of the facilities surveyed (Table 2), we discov-
ered the following: 68.2% (AA) of the facilities report-
ed having emergency preparedness plan staff directory. 
Another 50% (A) of them reported the existence of 
emergency planning group and the same figure report-
ed pre-assigned victims reception areas. The facilities’ 
response capability to external disaster such as RTA 
was only 22.7% (BA) and, with just 27.3% (BA) of the 
facilities having on-site disaster response team. With 
respect to organizational charts, about 32% (BA) had 
disaster organizational charts, with 36.4% having inci-
dent disaster organizational charts that were recom-
mended by their respective Incident Command Struc-
tures. Of those facilities assessed, only 32% of them 
conducted regular drills or simulation exercises.  
 
Table 1Percentage distribution of emergency operating 















         
4.5           4.5  
       
45.5  
Documented emergen-
cy plan  22.7 
          
-             4.5  
       
27.3  
Institutional support, 
training & education 77.3 
          
-             9.1  
       
86.4  
Financial support  36.4 -     -       36.4  
Free disaster treatment 
victims  45.5 
         
9.1            -    
       
54.5  
Availability of RTA 
management protocol 36.4 
         
4.5           4.5  
       
45.5  
Paid disaster treatment 
victim 22.7 
          
-             4.5  
       
27.3  
Availability of proto-
col for management of 
burns 50.0 
         
4.5            -    
       
54.5  
Availability of special 
ward for management 
of burns 31.8 
          
-              -    
       
31.8  
 
Triage and Surge Capacity planning 
The study found that the triage standards designed by 
the Ghana Health Service, (GHS) and distributed to all 
Government Hospitals is flawed because it did not pro-
vide for field or on-site care management as reported in 
Table 2, but only covered minimally in-hospital ER 
operations. Since our review was not on in-house 
emergency protocol, we did not evaluate the GHS’s 
triage for on-site interventions.  
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We assumed also that the two private facilities not un-
der the control of the GHS that were involved in this 
assessment might have the same kind of triage in place, 
though theirs could be different. This assumption was 
based on the rationale articulated by Reason (2000) 
that in any given industry, practices tend to be similar 
even within dissimilar structures.18  
 
In Table 3, 50% of the facilities reported not having 
extra beds and respirators. Only 9.1% of the facilities 
had MRI machine. Encouraging reports were made 
about the facilities capacities for carrying suitable wa-
ter storage with 81.8% having such a capacity and 
72.7% having blood storage capacity. In terms of 
emergency services provisions such as surgery, (Table 
4), 86.4% of the facilities reported providing surgery, 
but only 13.6% said they had personnel who were in 
fact surgeons.  
 
The facilities scored below average marks in terms of 
the availability of paediatric personnel, 45.5%, anaes-
thesiologists, 27.3%, ENT specialists, 40.9%, Ortho-
paedics, 36.4%, Urology, 31.8%. Optimism was re-
vealed by the report that the facilities had 100% capaci-
ty for laboratories personnel. 
 
Table 2 Percentage distribution of emergency prepar-















       
18.2            -             4.5  





       
54.5  
        
9.1           4.5  




       
40.9  
        
4.5           4.5  




       
27.3            -             4.5  





       
31.8            -             4.5  




       
22.7  
        
4.5            -    





       
50.0            -              -    
       
50.0  
Staff assigned to 
security & crowd 
control 
       
40.9    4.5            -    
       
45.5  
Regular drills 
       
31.8            -              -    
       
31.8  
 
Human capacity in Emergency medicine and Hospi-
tals Mutual-Aid Agreements, (MAA) 
In the analysis of the survey instrument, it was found 
that the estimated percentage distribution of true resi-
dent trauma doctors in the facilities may be less than 
22.7%. It was also found that amongst the medical per-
sonnel responding to the Winneba Junction Gas tanker 
explosion, a day or so later, were doctors from the pub-
lic hospitals in the capital.  
 
The distance between Accra, the capital and Winneba 
municipality is about 56-58 kilometres, depending on 
the start point of travel. This distance can be covered in 
a reasonable driving time. The private hospitals did not 
send any team and it was not clear whether any request 
was made for their involvement. This could be due in 
part to the fact that some of the same doctors working 
in government hospitals, in fact do locums in private 
clinics. The study also found that there were no hospi-
tal Mutual Aid Agreements, (MAA) between the chain 
of government hospitals and the private hospitals on 
one hand or even amongst the hospitals under the um-
brella of the Ministry of Health and the GHS on the 
other hand.  
 













Emergency kits        59.1  9.1  4.5      72.7  
Electric generator        54.5  -    4.5  59.1  
X-ray equipment        54.5  4.5  4.5  63.6  
Hydrotherapy pool        18.2  -    -    18.2  
Respirators        45.5  -    4.5  50.0  
Anaesthesia ma-
chine        40.9  -    4.5  45.5  
MRI machine      9.1  -    -    9.1  
Extra beds        40.9  4.5  4.5  50.0  
Blood storage facil-
ity        68.2  -    4.5  72.7  
Suitable water stor-
age facility        63.6  
            
9.1  
                  
9.1  
       
81.8  
 
Ambulance Services, community transport system and 
EMS delivery system 
The goal of a good pedestrian public health program in 
emergency response is to provide wide and evenly dis-
tributed patients to medical facilities across the nation. 
Ghana as at the end of April 2009 had 26 ambulances 
for the entire nation which were distributed to the re-
gions.35 The Ghana National Fire Service which could 
have augmented the work of the EMS team has neither 
its own fleet of ambulances nor are ambulances at-
 
  
March 2012     I.D. Norman et al  Hospital all-risk emergency preparedness 
 39 
tached to Fire Stations. They do not routinely provide 
first aid to victims at fire sites, not for want of skill but 
for the lack of equipment and supplies.28,29,30  
At the time of visit to the health facilities in this study 
in 2010, none of them had a dedicated ambulance to 
transport referral cases or respond to emergencies out-
side of the parameters of the hospitals. This shortcom-
ing is filled by what we call Community Emergency 
Transport System, (CETS) where private citizens use 
their private cars or hire commercial vehicles to 
transport the sick, injured or acute cases in need of 
immediate medical emergency assistance.  
In CETS vehicles, the skills of volunteers fall short of 
what is expected from an EMS crew. In cases of burns 
victims transport, the lack of national hospital emer-


















cine        50.0            -             9.1  
       
59.1  
Surgery        72.7  9.1         4.5  86.4  
Obstetrics and  
Gynaecology        40.9  
         
4.5           9.1  54.5  
Internal medicine        50.0  4.5           9.1  63.6  
Paediatrics        40.9            -             4.5  45.5  
Anaesthesiologists        22.7            -             4.5  27.3  
ENT specialist        36.4            -             4.5  40.9  
Ophthalmologists        50.0  4.5           9.1  63.6  
Orthopaedics        36.4            -              -    36.4  
Urology        27.3            -             4.5  31.8  
Laboratories        81.8  9.1           9.1  100.0  
 
DISCUSSION 
The inadequacies of the hospital system in Ghana in 
responding to RTAs and other emergencies raise seri-
ous public health concerns. The biggest challenge fac-
ing the hospitals in their emergency intervention is the 
lack of pre-emergency and emergency preparedness 
plans as well as the coordination of the hospitals re-
sponse mechanisms.  
 
Part of the solution in developing good practices for 
pre-hospital emergency management, is to provide both 
long-term and short-term approaches.2,26 The develop-
ment of Hospital Emergency Plans for the hospital sys-
tem of Ghana in the short-term can be achieved at little 
or no cost to either the individual hospitals or the Gov-
ernment.  
 
Developing emergency plan and teams as well as inci-
dent command structures do not cost money as well. 
Executing triage standards to be applied nationally 
does not involve a great deal of money but the political 
will of the supervisory ministry or agency of the hospi-
tal system in Ghana. The plan should provide for par-
tial or complete evacuation of the facility including 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU), prenatal and antenatal units 
in case of fire, explosion, accidental release of gaseous 
material, flooding or water mains burst or collapsed 
roof structure or criminal invasion of the facility. 
Evacuation of a facility such as a hospital, presumes a 
safe haven or resettlement of the patients to a second-
ary facility or a different location, which could be 
achieved through Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA).24,26 
 
MAAs are based on areas of specialization and staff, 
proximity and existing regulatory bodies, legislation 
and medical malpractice requirements, vis-à-vis im-
munity provisions. Due to competition within govern-
ment hospitals and between private hospitals and doc-
tors, cooperation can negatively affect emergency re-
sponse capabilities of a district. Some experts believe 
that in severe emergencies, all hospitals and doctors 
pull together to address the exigency despite competi-
tion. 20 In the case of the Winneba Gas Tanker explo-
sion, the outcome of the medical emergency response 
clearly affirmed the position that without a well-
articulated hospital MAAs, response capability could 
be undermined.  
 
There is no clearly articulated position of the Ghana 
Medical and Dental Council on MAAs or that of the 
Hospitals or Ministry of Health or Ghana Health Ser-
vices on MAAs. The position of the law and the insur-
ance industry on MAAs in terms of apportionment of 
professional responsibility and cost is also not clear, 
which stems from the fact that there is no national poli-
cy on MAAs to begin with. The national facilities do 
not routinely conduct systems wide simulation exercis-
es. Simulation exercises are a good way for facilities to 
identify bottlenecks in a facility’s internal preparedness 
plans as well as in routine emergency standards at 
emergency room (ER) and in-hospital triage.  
 
Though simulation exercises are costly to execute de-
pending on the complexities involved and the size of 
the facility, simulation exercises can enhance operating 
systems if they are incorporated into the routine opera-
tions of the facility with the means to assess and evalu-
ate their efficiencies.  
 
As reported, only 68.2% (AA) of the facilities reported 
having emergency preparedness plan staff directory.  
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Another 50% (A) of them reported the existence of 
emergency planning group and the same figure was 
reported for pre-assigned victims’ reception areas.  
 
The evaluation of the facilities’ response capabilities to 
external disasters outside the hospitals’ ER and wards 
such as in RTAs was only 22.7% (BA). This outcome 
is low and does not augur well with a good institutional 
readiness. Although preparing organizational charts as 
a short-term measure does not require a lot of money, 
only 31.8% (BA) had disaster organizational charts, 
with 36.4% having incident disaster organizational 
charts that were recommended by their respective Inci-
dent Command Structures. Of those facilities assessed, 
only 31.8% of them conducted regular drills or simula-
tion exercises to sharpen their emergency intervention 
skills, knowledge and abilities.  
 
Even without the aid of cross tabulation of the respons-
es, it is clear to see that the national hospital emergency 
preparedness program does not really exist as an inte-
gral part of the hospital system. If a facility has a des-
ignated emergency preparedness plan staff directory 
that facility should also have emergency planning 
group as well as disaster organizational charts in order 
to assign the staff whose names are in the emergency 
responses directory to specific duties. All of such activ-
ities would have to emanate from the emergency plan, 
if one existed. 
 
EMS in Ghana is a medical-transport vehicle. Few 
have Basic Life Support, (BLS) teams. Fewer still have 
Advance Cardiac Life Support, (ACSL). Basic Life 
Support (BLS) Services is pre-hospital and inter-
hospital emergency care and non-emergency medical 
care that includes airway management, cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation (CPR), control of shock and bleed-
ing, and splinting of fractures.19,20,24,25,26 Advance Life 
Support (ALS) Services is an advanced level of pre-
hospital and inter-hospital emergency care and non-
emergency medical care that includes basic life-support 
care, cardiac monitoring, cardiac defibrillation, electro-
cardiography, intravenous therapy, administration of 
medications, drugs and solutions, use of adjunctive 
medical devices, trauma care and other authorized 
techniques and procedures.24,26  
 
In the nation’s EMS/CETS vehicles and in the case of 
burns, many of the district hospitals have practical lo-
gistical difficulties in effectively managing such cases 
during transportation of patients to the more resourced 
facilities in the urban centres. In addition to the prob-
lem of lack of appropriate EMS vehicles, they also 
lacked appropriate equipment and supplies and, in 
some cases, personnel. They are faced with the prob-
lem of monitoring body temperature to determine the 
onset of hypothermia, impairment of oxygen consump-
tion and to establish the degree of injury. Hypothermia 
at pre-hospital treatment of burn patients is a common 
risk factor associated with morbidity. When the 
transport vehicles are not equipped with the appropriate 
equipment, it is difficult to determine the role of hypo-
thermia in the patho-physiology, the type of treatment 
and epidemiology of the victims.12 
 
In emergency cases brought to the hospitals, 54.5% 
(AB) of the facilities said they provided “free treatment 
of patients during disaster situations”, which may sug-
gest that they do not always care for emergency RTA 
cases. The National Health Insurance Scheme provides 
for hospitals to treat emergency cases whether the pa-
tient is a registered member or not. This is inconsistent 
with the National Health Insurance Regulations, 
(NHIR) 2004 (L. I. 1809), Schedule II, Part I: Regula-
tion 19(1): Minimum Healthcare Benefits, Section 6 
(a), (b), (e), and (f). The difficulty is how to determine 
what a national, regional or district emergency is or 
when it is declared.  
 
The guideline for such a determination is informed by 
the internationally recognized standard that, the offer 
of free medical services should be in situations where 
there is a national or regional and district wide official 
emergency declaration consistent with local or national 
legislation. In the case of Ghana, Articles 31 to 33 of 
the 1992 Constitution provide the rubric. In the case of 
RTA and other medical emergencies listed in L. I 1809 
of the NHIR, exceptional circumstances have been 
carved out of the law, making it possible for healthcare 
services to be provided without the formal declaration 
of a state of emergency. 
 
 Therefore, Schedule II, Part I, sub-section 6 of L. I. 
1809 appears to be an exception to the standard rule, 
the non-compliance of which may result in prima facie 
case of negligence. The hospital system in Ghana is in 
need of reparation for both routine healthcare delivery 
and for emergency situations. It needs to be mended for 
the nation to meet the broader objectives of the Millen-
nium Development Goals by 2015. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We make the following conclusions to this paper based 
upon the outcome of the research reported that: 
a) The national response to emergencies as well as 
RTAs is disorganized and often undertaken by 
emergent groups. This situation calls for im-
provements in emergency preparedness en mass, 
together with improvements in physician skills for 
injury management. 
b) The hospitals’ respective abilities to handle large 
scale RTA’s were compromised by the lack of 
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competent medical and allied health personnel and 
adequate supplies.  
c) Many of the nation’s hospitals were not prepared 
for large RTA’s resulting in surge demands, and 
did not possess general emergency preparedness 
programs, let alone surge capacity planning.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
a) The Ministry of Health with the Ghana Health 
Service needs to develop a system for resourcing 
the hospitals and health facilities under its care and 
to ensure that all other health facilities are likewise 
resourced. This would, hopefully, create the syn-
ergy for building a resilient healthcare system that 
is capable of handling emergencies of all kinds; 
consistent with W. H. O standards and best prac-
tices.  
 
b) Both MOH and GHS need to provide a system for 
managing the efficient distribution and treatment 
of RTA and burn victims among its chain of hospi-
tals and clinics as well as enter into Mutual Aid 
Agreements with private facilities for a coordinat-
ed response to RTAs.  
 
c) It is highly recommended that GHS and MOH 
would develop the template for hospital emergen-
cy planning, surge capacity planning and provide 
the needed funds for personnel training for disas-
ters risk reduction and mitigation. 
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